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Abstract: - The radiological risk is related to a wide range of activities, beginning with the medical and 
military ones and including those connected to the industrial and research activities such as nuclear fusion. A 
valid tool to predict the consequences of the accidents and reduce the risk is represented by computing systems 
that allow modeling the evolution of a possible release of radioactive materials over time and space. In 
addition to proprietary codes there are free license codes, like Hot-Spot, that allow providing a set of tools to 
simulate diffusion in case of accidents involving radioactive materials and analyze the safety and security of the 
facilities in which the radioactive material is manipulated. The case studies scenario’s consists in two 
simulations accidents scenario the first to biomass plant and the second at nuclear fission plant. 
 The simulation of the radioactive contamination have been conducted with the code HOT SPOT, a free license 
code. The results of the simulation and data discussion will be presented in this work by the authors. 
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays the Decision Support Systems (like  
software) to support experts during the emergency 
planning operations in case of an unconventional 
events (like a radioactive diffusion) are one of the 
key safety and security issue of the new millennium. 
The accidents, (either intentional or natural) that 
cause a negative impact on environment and human 
health, are increasing proportionally to the needs of 
energy of human society. Chernobyl and Fukushima 
are just two examples of contaminations that have 
provoked short term and long term negative 
consequences. The DSS are necessary not only to 
guarantee the correct chose of safety way out  that 
increase the safety of operators and population in 
case of accident but also to improve the prevention 
phase that is essential in an emergency planning 
system. The work has been developed in the context  
of the activities of the International Master Courses 
in Protection Against CBRNe events and realized by 
experts (the students of the Master) coming from 
Academic Entities and also from Minister of Interior 
and Ministry of Defence. According to the high cost 
of the DSS officially used by these Ministers, the 
authors decide to test free license tools to 
demonstrate their functionality in case of 
emergency. The free license code used in this work 
is HOT SPOT code, it was used to simulate different 
type of radioactive accident scenarios and the 
diffusion of contamination in open field. The 
authors decide to simulate two different types of 
accidental events: 1) a biomass plant from energy 
production that use combustible taken in the 
neighborhood of Chernobyl and contaminated with 
137Cs due to the radioactive fallout [1-3].The 
geographical area considered to simulate this 
scenario has been an industrial area of Piemonte 
(Italy region) full of biomass plants. 2) The 
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radiological accident in the reprocessing plant at 
Tomsk, which occurred on 6th April 1993 during 
the reprocessing of irradiated reactor fuel at the 
Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SCE) in the Radio 
Chemicals Work (RCW) facility at Tomsk-7 that is 
has been widely described in the International 
Atomic Energy Agency publication “Radiological 
accident in the reprocessing plant at Tomsk in 1993. 
The HOT SPOT code has been used in the present 
paper to simulate the radioactive diffusion due to at 
two case studies accident. In this paper, the scenario 
together with the main results of the simulations will 
be presented, analyzed and discussed to understand 
the real possibility to use HOT SPOT as DSS during 
the prevention and/or intervention emergency 
phases. 
 
2 Problem Formulation  
2.1 Case study 1 
Large parts of north-eastern Europe have been 
subject to fallout of radioactive nuclides “fallout" 
after the Chernobyl accident. These radioactive 
nuclides have been deposited on the ground at 
concentrations highly variable from area to area 
depending on the weather conditions and orography 
[1-3]. 
Many years after the event, the Cs-137 remains the 
dominant radionuclide contamination, since it has a 
medium half-life (30 years) and it is characterized 
by a high mobility in the environment. 
The cesium is "moving" in ecosystems 
contaminated by passing from an array to another: 
from the atmosphere to the water and from the water 
back to the plants, soils, animals, humans and so on. 
If the radionuclides deposited on the ground, as a 
consequences of rain events, pass from the surface 
layers to the deeper ones becomes chemically 
available for roots uptake by trees. It happened after 
the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, cesium has 
reached the deeper layers of the ground and has 
been “uptake” from the roots of forest trees thanks 
to competition mechanisms with the potassium ion, 
and the roots metabolize it [4]. 
The degree of contamination is different depending 
on whether and if the lands are cultivated or not. In 
farmlands, the continuous mixing causes the cesium 
homogenous distribution in various ground layers; if 
the land is not cultivated, the cesium has time to 
sink from the surface layers to the deep ones. The 
factors that make the ground a potential source of 
release are manifold: the composition of the soil in 
the percentage of clay and organic components, the 
pH, etc. . 
Between the ground and the roots is established a 
balance of trade, maintained by the so-called "ionic 
labile pool" of ground which serves to provide bio-
available elements for the roots. 
For those that are its chemical characteristics, the 
cesium in the ground is available only in a soluble 
form. It is absorbed by the roots of the plants that, 
with a delay of a few years, achieve a certain 
amount of cesium in the wood of trees grown on the 
contaminated ground. 
Since of the  half-life of cesium-137 about 30 years, 
it is still possible to detect the presence of 
radioactive material in the timber from areas 
affected by the Chernobyl disaster. 
It has been decided to simulate the consequences of 
an accident in a biomass plant for energy production 
using combustible coming from areas situated in the 
neighborhood of Chernobyl. It has been choose the 
Piemonte a region north Italy of because of its high 
density of biomass plants (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Fig.1. Map of thermic plants in Piemonte. The red box represent the 
selected point in which the accidents has been simulated 
 
The biomass plant selected for the simulation has an 
estimated medium annual consume of 3680 m3 of 
wood combustible (“cippato”). The plant is active 
130 days per year and the estimated daily medium 
consume of wood combustible is 28 m3 (almost 
8400 Kg considering that a combustible with a 
medium weight of 300 Kg/m3 and a humidity of 
40%). 
The height of emission point of the plant has been 
estimated at 15m with a diameter of 60cm in 
agreements with the real data of the plants. 
The accident scenarios simulated are dispersion of 
137CS from chimney in different conditions 
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2.2 Case study 2 
The reprocessing procedure for spent nuclear fuel in 
the RCW (Recirculated Cooling Water) facility 
requires subsequent steps in which irradiated 
standard uranium blocks were loaded into vessels 
and dissolved in concentrated nitric acid [28]. The 
resulting solution transferred to other vessels where 
it was prepared for extraction by adjusting the 
acidity and temperature. The stainless steel vessels, 
which had a volume of 34 m3 and incorporate a 
steam heating and cooling sleeve, were located in a 
series of cells below the ground level, with 2m thick 
concrete walls and a concrete roof. During this 
process, an essential step represented by the 
insufflation of compressed air in the vessel, which is 
necessary to ensure the mixing of the different 
solutions in order to avoid: 
 The separation of the solutions; 
 The exergonic reaction between the nitric 
acid solution and the organic solvent, 
mainly TBP (tributylphosphate). 
This is a very critical step because a lack of 
compressed is one of the main causes of the 
accident and it is not possible to determine if it due 
to a human error or a plant failure. This 
phenomenon was the cause at Tomsk-7 of the 
energetic reaction between nitric acid and the 
organic substances that provoked an increase of 
temperature and increase of gas production. The 
operators endeavors to depressurize the vessel 
trough adjacent installations were unsuccessful 
because the amount of gas was higher than the one 
that could be vented through the stack so under 
these conditions the pressure rose up to 18 atm 
leading to the rupture of the vessel. The resulting 
shock wave was sufficiently intense to raise and 
displace the concrete slabs forming the roof of the 
cell causing a structural damage to the equipment 
room above. A schematic representation of the 
installation involved in the accident is showed in 
Figure 2. [28] 
According to the technical documentation, during 
the accident the solutions in the vessel involved in 
the explosion was supposed to contain a total of: 
 449  ± 120  g of Plutonium (specific 
activity of 2,3 TBq/kg) ; 
 8757 ± 286  kg of Uranium (specific 
activity of 12.4 MBq) 
 
 
Fig. 2 : Schematic diagram of the installation which shows the location 
of the vessel and the rooms above involved in the accident[28] 
Corresponding to total activities of 1.0 TBq and 
0.11TBq respectively [29].  
These data are in contrast with those obtained from 
the cleanup operations conducted after the accident 
where: 
  577± 117 g of Plutonium  
 8707 ± 350 kg of Uranium 
and were collected from the installation and the cell 
in which they were located. The authors of the 
IAEA report [28] state that this discrepancy may be 
due to the fact that part of the material recovered 
after the accident originated by previous extraction 
cycles.  
A month after the accident, soil samples were 
collected for the assessment of the ground 
contamination on the SCE site and its proximity. 
The total beta and gamma activity detected was 4.3 
TBq whose main contribution was due to the 
following radionuclides: 0.04TBq of 103Ru, 0.92 
TBq of 106Ru, 0.80 TBq of 95Zr and 2.54 TBq of 
95Nb 
In order to estimate the total activity released during 
the accident two models, based on the extrapolations 
derived from the levels of contamination, have been 
used. Both these models based on the Risø PUFF 
diffusion model, a three-dimensional model which 
simulates the release of Gaussian pollutant puffs 
predicting their concentration as they diffused and 
affected downwind by a horizontally homogeneous 
time-dependent wind, taking into account 
atmospheric characteristics such as turbulence 
intensity, potential temperature gradient, buoyant 
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heat flux and maximum mixing depth [30]. The first 
model (Model 1) makes the assumption of a release 
time of 15min and incorporated measurements of 
the radionuclide content taken from 11 snow 
samples  
[31], while the second (Model 2) makes the 
assumption of an instant time release and 
incorporated measurement from 120 samples of  
snow and soil taken from 16 profiles across the 
area[32]. Estimates of the amount of different 
radionuclides evaluated from these two models are 
shown in table 1.  
 
 
Tab. 1 : Estimated activity (TBq) released during the accident [28]. 
 
The releases due to the accident started in two 
different places:  
1. through breaches in the walls at a height of 
15-30 m which accounted for 50-60% of the 
activity released,  
2. the roof at a height of 100-150 m.  
Furthermore, the measurement of the ground 
contamination showed a singularity consisting in the 
presence of two maxima in the deposited activity 
across the contaminated area at right angles to the 
direction of the release at distances up to 12km from 
the Radio Chemical Works (RCW).  
The authors of the report state that this pattern could 
be explained assuming that the release originating 
from the roof and the walls of the RCW are 
combined together with the wind directions which, 
for the different heights are considered different 
(190 degrees at ground level and 210 degrees at 
100-200m height) [28].  
 
3 Materials and methods 
3.1 HOTSPOT code 
The HotSpot Health Physics code and HotSpot 
codes are aimed at providing emergency response 
personnel and emergency planners with a fast, field-
portable set of software tools for evaluating 
incidents involving radioactive materials [5]. The 
software is also used for safety analysis of facilities 
handling radioactive materials.. It is designed for 
near-surface releases, short-range (less than 10 km) 
dispersion, and short-term (less than 24 hours) 
release duration. The HotSpot codes are 
continuously updated to incorporate the most 
current and approved radiological dose conversion 
data and methodologies. These codes are based on 
the well-established Gaussian Plume Model (GPM). 
Main advantages of the Gaussian plume models are: 
1) short computation time, 2)extensive validation 
and broad acceptance worldwide. For the evaluation 
of radiological scenarios, HotSpot uses the methods 
of radiation dosimetry recommended by the 
International Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP) [6] and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) Federal Guidance 
Reports No. 11, 12 and 13 [7-9]. In order to 
simulate different meteorological conditions HOT 
SPOT allows the selection of the Pasquill classes. 
 
3.1.1 Pasquill Classes used in HOT SPOT  
Meteorologists distinguish several states of the local 
atmosphere: A, B, C, D, E, F. These states can be 
tabulated as a function of weather conditions, wind 
speed and time of day. According to the stability 
class, the attack can result in a wide spectrum of 
lethal effects. Therefore, the potential terrorist will 
certainly consider those, just as it happens by war-
planners, so that the lethal effects are maximized. 
The stability of the atmosphere depends on the 
temperature difference between an air parcel and the 
air surrounding it. Therefore, different levels of 
stability may depend on the temperature difference  
between the air Parcel and the surrounding air. [10-
11]. 
The stability classes used for this work are referred 
to Pasquill – Gifford stability [10]. Stability classes 
A, B, and C refer to daytime hours with unstable 
conditions. Stability D is representative of overcast 
days or nights with neutral conditions. Stabilities E 
and F refer to night time, stable conditions and are 
based on the amount of cloud cover. Thus, 
classification A represents conditions of the greatest 
instability, and classification F reflects conditions of 
the greatest stability. 
 
Radionuclide 
Model 1 
activity 
(Tbq) 
Model 2 
activity (TBq) 
106Ru 11.1 7.9 
103Ru 0.37 0.34 
95Nb 17.4 11.2 
95Zr 7.8 5.1 
14Ce - 0.37 
144Ce - 0.24 
125Sb - 0.10 
239Pu 7.4 10-3 5.2 10-3 
Total 36.7 
25.3 
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 3.2 SELECTION OF BUONDARY 
CONDITIONS 
3.2.1 Case study 1  
The authors, expert in simulation of unconventional 
events [12-19, 24-27], choose the model “General 
Plume” to simulate the accident that is ideal for the 
radioactive release from a chimney [17,19,23]. After 
that the principal boundary conditions has been 
uploaded in the GUI (Graphical User Interface) of 
the software (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Fig.3. Source term condition uploaded in HOT SPOT GUI 
 
In order to estimate the contamination values of 
137Cs in the wood has been considered the data from 
a technical report by University of Pavia [20]. The 
maximum level of contamination detected have 
been 320 Bq/Kg for combustible wood (“cippato”) 
and 40000 Bq/Kg for ashes. The combustion of 
wood generates 85% of volatile substances, the 14% 
of carbon and the 1% of ashes so in the simulation 
the authors consider only the activity of combustible 
wood as value of contamination. The reality, as 
reported in [21], the use of ashes is considered the 
worst for human health, but it is not considered in 
this work.  
The accident scenarios simulated have been two. In 
table 2 are reported the two different meteorological 
conditions: 
 
Scenario Wind speed 
(at 15 m) 
Stability 
Class 
Wind 
Direction 
1 3 m/s C 225 
(from SW) 
2 0,5 m/s D 225 
(from SW) 
Tab. 2. Meteorological conditions 
 
For both the scenarios, the height of the emission 
point is 15 meters and the sampling times has been 
fixed at 30 minutes. The DFC library used is the 
FGR 11 that allows to include the phenomena of 
reflection on ground and resuspension of particulate 
[23]. The value of the mean respiratory flux has 
been fixed at 3,33 x 10-4 m3/s (as described for a 
population with a medium intensity activity). The 
values of TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) 
as sum of equivalent dose for each organ in the body 
(both for external and internal deposition) have been 
added together with the values of radioactivity on 
the ground (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Fig.4. Setup condition uploaded in HOT SPOT GUI 
 
The boundary conditions foresee also three different 
bands: internal, medium and external, that are 
graphically represented as three different zones of 
the plume in the contaminated zone. The TEDE and 
the ground deposition represent the values of 
highest interest for an analysis on radioactive 
particulate contamination. The last boundary 
condition selected has been the modality “compass” 
on data output that allows a representation of all the 
area potentially involved during the contamination 
in accordance with wind variation [18,19]. 
 
 
3.2.1 Case study 2 
During the release took place the wind was blowing 
at a speed of 8-13 m/s, from a southwesterly 
direction and due to the snow that was falling [28] 
the sky must have been highly overcast; these two 
variables affect the spread of the contamination due 
to an atmospheric release. A parameter which takes 
into consideration these meteorological aspects to 
define the turbulence status of the system under 
investigation is the Pasquill’s stability class which is 
also a parameter used in the HotSpot code. In this 
particular case, the meteorological conditions during 
the accident are coherent with the Pasquill’s 
stability class “D” which means the absence of 
turbulence. The falling snow also increased the dry 
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deposition velocity of the particles released of a 
factor of ten taking into account also the dry 
deposition velocity estimated to be 1,0x10-3 ms-1, in 
fact the estimated deposition velocity for all the 
gamma and beta emitters varied between 0.15 and 
0.20ms-1 . The HotSpot model chosen for the 
benchmark was “General Explosion”. This model 
allows the user to specify the quantity of high 
explosive (TNT equivalent) which caused the 
explosion; the default value of the code is 1 lb (a 
conservative estimate of the TNT equivalent of an 
exploding vehicle gas tank [33] which resulted 
appropriate also for simulating the rupture of the 
vessel due to the high pressure). The IAEA report 
did not provide sufficient data regarding the initial 
content of 106Ru. It did provide the estimated 
activity released during the accident according to 
two different dispersion models which ranged 
between 7.9 and 11.1 TBq. Starting from this 
experimental evidence, the authors selected the 
mean value of 9.5 TBq supposed to be an 
appropriate value for the “Source Term”. 
Furthermore, since this was an estimate of the 106Ru 
already deposited on the ground, the default value of 
1.0 for the Damage Ratio (the fraction of the MAR 
actually impacted in the release scenario) has been 
chosen, meaning that all the MAR was released. 
Since the explosion created a breach in the roof and 
side walls of the installation, no filtration 
mechanism could have mitigated the release of the 
MAR. The software evaluates this feature in terms 
of “Leakpath Factor” ( i.e. the fraction of the MAR 
that passes through some confinement or filtration 
mechanism: a value of 1.0, chosen for the 
benchmark, is representative of the absence of such 
mechanisms). The Deposition Velocity estimated 
for the deposition of the beta-gamma emitters was 
of about 0.20ms-1 [34] and this was the value 
chosen for the benchmark. As mentioned above, the 
simulations were divided in two distinct groups of 
scenario named “Simulations 190°” and 
“Simulations 210°” with regard to the different wind 
directions assuming the release of the 65% of the 
total 106Ru activity and the release of 35% of the 
total 106Ru activity (6,175 TBq and  3,325 TBq  
respectively). The “General Explosion” one does 
not allow the user to set the release height. The only 
parameters introduced to “simulate” different 
meteorological conditions at different height were 
the wind speed (5 ms-1 and 10 ms-1) and the stability 
Pasquill classes D and C, which are the first and 
second more probable stability classes for the height 
of 20 and 125 m [35] (used in the simulations as 
mean value for the release height).  Furthermore, for 
each scenario, different sample times have been 
considered. Finally, since the duration of the release 
could not be assessed during the accident, two 
different sample times have been chosen for each 
simulation in order to evaluate both: an 
instantaneous (1min sample time) and time 
protracted release (10min sample time). Options and 
values for the simulations are shown in Table 3 and 
Table 4. 
 
 
 
Tab. 3: Options and values for: a) Simulations 190°(unmodified 
HotSpot default values are not shown). 
 
 
 
Tab. 4: Options and values for: a) Simulations 210°(unmodified 
HotSpot default values are not shown). 
 
 Simulations 190° 
Model General Explosion 
Source Term  
Radionuclide Ru-106 W 368.2 d 
Material-at-
Risk 
6,175 TBq 
Deposition 
Velocity 
20 cms-1 
 Simulation 190° D Simulation 190° C 
 190° D WS 5 ms-1 
190° D WS 10 
ms-1 
190° C WS 5 ms-
1 
190 C WS 10 ms-
1 
Meteorology     
10-meter-
wind-speed 
5  ms-1 10 ms-1 5  ms-1 10  ms-1 
Wind 
Direction 
190° 190° 190° 190° 
Stability Class D D C C 
 
ST 10 
min 
ST 1 min 
ST 10 
min 
ST 1 
min 
ST 10 
min 
ST 1 
min 
ST 10 
min 
ST 1 
min 
Setup         
Sample time 10 min 1 min 10 min 1 min 10 min 1 min 10 min 1 min 
Non-respirable 
Deposition 
Velocity 
20 
cms-1 
20 cms-1 
20 cms-
1 
20 
cms-1 
20 cms-
1 
20 
cms-1 
20 cms-
1 
20 
cms-1 
 
 Simulations 210° 
Model General Explosion 
Source Term  
Radionuclide Ru-106 W 368.2 d 
Material-at-
Risk 
3,325 TBq 
Deposition 
Velocity 
20 cms-1 
 Simulation 210° D Simulation 210° C 
 210° D WS 5 ms-1 
210° D WS 10 
ms-1 
210° C WS 5 ms-
1 
210 C WS 10 ms-
1 
Meteorology     
10-meter-
wind-speed 
5  ms-1 10 ms-1 5  ms-1 10  ms-1 
Wind 
Direction 
210° 210° 210° 210° 
Stability Class D D C C 
 
ST 10 
min 
ST 1 min 
ST 10 
min 
ST 1 
min 
ST 10 
min 
ST 1 
min 
ST 10 
min 
ST 1 
min 
Setup         
Sample time 10 min 1 min 10 min 1 min 10 min 1 min 10 min 1 min 
Non-respirable 
Deposition 
Velocity 
20 
cms-1 
20 cms-1 
20 cms-
1 
20 
cms-1 
20 cms-
1 
20 
cms-1 
20 cms-
1 
20 
cms-1 
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 The ground contamination data available for 106Ru 
have been detected at the distance of 4.5km, 7.0km 
and 12.0km in a northwesterly direction from the 
point of the release. For this reason, the default 
values for the “Receptors” were modified in order to 
obtain the x and y coordinates which corresponded 
to those downwind distances for both wind 
directions (190° and 210°): their values are shown 
in Table 1. The z coordinate, which identifies the 
receptor’s height from the ground has a default 
value of 1.5m, this value has not been modified 
since it is irrelevant when analyzing the ground 
deposition. Values of x and y coordinates for 
downwind distances of 4.5km, 7.0km and 12.0km 
for the two wind directions 190° and 210° are 
shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 4 : Spatial coordinates for downwind distance of 4.5 km, 7.0 km 
and 12.0 km. 
 
4 Problem Solution 
 
4.1 Case study 1 
 
4.1.1 Results of Accident Scenario 1 
 
The first result analyzed (figure 5) is the general 
plume graph (represented in a polar coordinate 
system the release point located at axes origin). It is 
a picture of the plume at the end of the observation 
period (30 minutes). 
 
Fig.5. Plume at 30 minutes (Scenario 1) 
 
In the figure 6 it is represented the variation of 
equivalent dose (in Sievert) with the distance from 
the release point. The “receptor height” has been 
fixed at 1,5 meter (the breathable zone of a medium 
height zone) and so it is evident that the maximum 
of dose value is calculated at 100 meters from the 
release point.  
 
 
Fig.6. (Scenario 1) TEDE (in Sv) variation from the release point 
(height of 1,5 meters) 
 
In the figure 7 the variation with the distance of the 
ground deposition values is showed. 
 
Fig.7. (Scenario 1) TEDE (in Sv) variation from the release point 
(ground level) 
 
Downwind 
distance 
Simulations 
190° 
Simulations 
210° 
Km x (km) 
y 
(km) 
x 
(km) 
y (km) 
4.5  0,718 4,432 2,250 3,897 
7.0 1,216 6,894 3,500 6,062 
12.0  2,084 11,818 6,000 10,392 
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The table 5 shows all the output values from HOT 
SPOT. 
 
 
Tab.5. (Scenario 1) Output value from HOT SPOT 
 
4.1.2 Results of Accident Scenario 2 
 
The Accident Scenario 2 presents a variation in 
meteorological conditions (the stability class D has 
been uploaded in this case). It has been selected to 
analyze variation between 2 stability classes 
different in terms of wind speed [10]. In the figure 8 
the general plume is showed. 
 
 
Fig.8. Plume at 30 minutes (Scenario 2) 
 
Moreover, the figure 9 and 10 show, respectively, 
the ground deposition with a receptor height of 1,5 
meters (breathable area) and at ground level. 
 
Fig.9. (Scenario 2) TEDE (in Sv) variation from the release point 
(height of 1,5 meters) 
 
 
Fig.10. (Scenario 2) TEDE (in Sv) variation from the release point 
(ground level) 
 
4.3 Results and Analysis 
The comparison between the two different scenarios 
shows that the plume area of Scenario 2 are wider 
than the one in Scenario 1 and the plume is extended 
in a larger surface but the contamination values are 
negligible for this second scenario. 
The results of the case study 1 simulations show that 
the maximum value of contamination is detected at 
a distance of 130 meters from the release point (and 
is 9,61 x 10-6 mSv). The maximum value of ground 
contamination is lower than 1 Bq/m2 (Scenario 1) 
and 10 Bq/m2 (Scenario 2). 
The figure 11 shows a projection of the possible 
fallout in case of accident (in the worst scenario in 
absence of wind). Taking into account the prevalent 
wind in the considered area, the fallout zone can 
been delimited by two red lines (see figure 10). 
 
 
Fig.11. Delimitation of the possible fallout zone 
 
The cumulative dose obtained is 6x10-2 Sv/year, that 
is a value lowest than the one imposed by Italian 
Law [22,23].  
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 4.1 Case study 2 
The outputs generated by HotSpot with the sixteen 
combinations of values and options (Table 6) have 
been analyzed in order to find which combination 
was the more appropriate to describe the pattern and 
the amount of ground contamination with 106Ru. As 
shown in Table 6 a wind speed of 5 ms-1 associated 
to the Pasquill stability class “D” and a sample time 
of 1 min give a good match with the experimental 
data (Figure 12). Figure 12 showed the values of 
activity (kBq∙m-2) for ground deposition of106Ru at 
distance of : 4.5 km; 7.0 km; 12.0 km, computed 
by the HotSpot code with the options and values for 
the 5ms-1 wind speed (left) showed the best match 
with the experimental data for the ground 
contamination with 106Ru across the path of the 
fallout at different distances from the RCW (right) 
 
Tab. 6: Option and values of the benchmark showing the best 
correlation with the experimental values for the ground contamination 
with 106Ru. 
 
 
Figure 12 Values of activity (kBq∙m-2) for ground deposition of106Ru 
at distance of 4.5 km, 7.0 km and 12.0 km. 
 
The HotSpot software also allows the user to visualize 
both the TEDE contour plots and Ground Deposition 
Contour Plots which show the downwind and crosswind 
contours for dose levels and for the extent of the 
deposition respectively, and the TEDE Graph and Ground 
Deposition graph which display the relative values as a 
function of plume centerline downwind distance. The 
Ground Deposition contour plots for the two scenarios 
described in table 6 are shown in figure 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benchmark for ground contamination with 106Ru 
 Wind speed 5 m∙s-1 Wind speed 10 m∙s-1 
Model General Explosion General Explosion 
Source 
Term 
 
 
Radionuclide Ru-106 W 368.2 Ru-106 W 368.2 
Meteorology   
10-meter-
wind-speed 
5 m∙s-1 
10 m∙s-1 
Stability 
Class 
D 
D 
Setup   
Sample time 1 min 1 min 
Downwind 
distance 
     
  190°   190°  
Km 
x 
(km) 
y 
(km) 
kBq∙m-
2 
x 
(km) 
y 
(km) 
kBq∙m-
2 
4.5 0,718 4,432 690 0,718 4,432 700 
7.0 1,216 6,894 240 1,216 6,894 310 
12.0 2,084 11,818 55 2,084 11,818 110 
 210° 210° 
Km 
x 
(km) 
y 
(km) 
kBq∙m-
2 
x 
(km) 
y 
(km) 
kBq∙m-
2 
4.5 2,250 3,897 380 2,250 3,897 380 
7.0 3,500 6,062 130 3,500 6,062 150 
12.0 6,000 10,392 30 6,000 10,392 57 
a) 1) 
  
b) 2) 
  
c) 3) 
  
Figure 3 Values of activity (kBq∙m-2) for ground deposition of106Ru at distance of4.5 km, 7.0 km and 12.0 km, computed by the HotSpot code with 
the options and values for the 5ms-1 wind speed (left) which showed the best match with the experimental data for the ground contamination with 
106Ru across the path of the fallout at different distances from the RCW (right) 
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Fig. 13: Ground Deposition contour Plot for the two scenarios 
described in table 5 for wind direction 190° (a) and 210° (b). The 
contour values for the plume are 7.0E+02 (inner), 2,5E+02 (middle) 
and 5E+01(outer) for direction 190° and 4.0E+2 (inner) 1.0E+02 
(middle) and 2.0E+01 (outer) for direction 210 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The simulation of the events and the evolution of 
the plume were realized through the hotspot 
software. This software takes into account the 
weather conditions, the wind direction, the stack 
height, respiration, but does not take into account 
the topography of the area, the presence of buildings 
and / or obstacles to the advancement of the plume 
and the presence any updrafts. 
In the case studies that we have examined the area is 
flat and free of large buildings. Furthermore, the 
area is near the sea and it is not characterized by 
abnormal turbulences. According to that, the 
simulations improved should be closer to the reality. 
It should be said that the simulations performed with 
the software do not always consider all the 
parameters and variables that could affect the 
evolution of the plume.  This code needs very little 
time for calculations (less than 1minute) and very 
conservative estimations can be obtaining starting 
from very few initial information. The authors can 
affirm that the software can be used as a useful DSS 
to assist the decision maker, but cannot fully replace 
it. In case of an accident, however, the real 
measurements should be carried out to verify the 
goodness of the simulated data. 
Considering an event as the accident described, 
since the dose values calculated are very low 
(around an order of magnitude lower than the LAW 
limit), the approximations and the margin of error 
due to the simulation should not significantly alter 
the final results. At the conclusion of this study, we 
can say, with a good degree of reliability, that 
scenarios as the one proposed would constitute 
events without any radiological significance for the 
population and for the workers.  
The Hot Spot code could certainly be used also in 
the processes of: 
 Prevention; 
 Risk planning; 
 Support the decision-making process 
during the accidental events. 
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